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Abstract
The “Islamisation” of  Indonesia has exerted a transformative force on every 
aspect of  Indonesian society. That process continues today. It has created streams 
of  change and continuity in thoughts, ideologies and practices, of  enormous 
complexity. Strict doctrinal interpretation of  Koranic text is not a new 
phenomenon, contrary to what some reports in the mass media might suggest. 
Its roots stretch back at least as far as the 1800s with the outbreak of  violent 
conflicts between those urging a stricter, scripturalist application of  Islam, and 
those adhering to traditionalist and colonialist ideologies --culminating in the 
Padri war of  West Sumatra of  1821-38. Indicating an ostensible continuity 
of  ideology, modern extremist ideologues, such as Abu Bakar Bashir, urge 
their followers toward violent conflict and terrorist actions based on an ideology 
of  strict “Middle Eastern” interpretation of  fundamental Islamic tenets. 
This paper argues that the strategies of  those carrying out radical and violent 
ideologies are undergoing change, as are the strategies of  the authorities tasked 
with combating them. Radical groups have displayed a shift away from large-
scale, attacks on symbolic foreign targets towards low-level violence primarily 
aimed at law enforcement authorities. Authorities, on the other hand, have 
shown a greater tendency to shoot dead those suspected of  involvement with 
violent radical groups. This paper will examine the changing strategies of  violent 
radical groups and the continuity, and evolution, of  the underlying Islamic 
1 This paper is based on a paper presented at the 6th International Indonesia 
Forum: Transformation towards the Future; Continuity versus Change in Indonesia 
(Sunan Kalijaga State Islamic University Yogyakarta, Indonesia, 21-22 August 2013).
Vol. 52, no. 1 (2014), pp. 1-24, doi: 10.14421/ajis.2014.521.1-24
2 Al-Jāmi‘ah, Vol. 52, No. 1, 2014 M/1435 H
Adam James Fenton
ideology that provides religious justification for their violent acts. The paper 
will argue that engaging Indonesia’s politically active youth in an ideological 
dialogue on Islamism and democracy provides the best prospect for disengagement 
from, and breaking the cycle of  recruitment for, radical violence and terrorism. 
[Proses panjang Islamisasi di Indonesia telah menghasilkan kekuatan 
transformatif  di seluruh aspek kehidupan masyarakat Indonesia. Proses ini 
terus berlangsung hingga sekarang serta menciptakan gelombang perubahan 
berkesinambungan dalam pemikiran, ideologi, dan praktik-praktik dalam 
kompleksitas yang rumit. Penafsiran kaku atas ayat-ayat Quran sebenarnya 
bukanlah sesuatu yang baru, berbeda dengan apa yang selama ini diasumsikan 
di media. Fenomena seperti ini dapat dirunut kembali pada era 1800an, 
khususnya pada konflik bersenjata yang terjadi antara penganjur penerapan 
tekstual ajaran Islam dengan para penganut ideologi tradisional dan penjajah, 
yang berpuncak pada Perang Padri di Sumatra Barat tahun 1821-38. 
Dengan ideologi serupa, para ideolog modern dari kelompok garis keras, 
seperti Abu Bakar Bashir, mendorong pengikutnya untuk melakukan aksi 
kekerasan dan teror dengan mendasarkan diri pada ideologi ala Timur Tengah 
dengan penafsiran dasar-dasar Islam secara kaku. Tulisan ini mendalilkan 
bahwa strategi kelompok yang mengusung ideologi radikal dan kekerasan terus 
mengalami perubahan seiring perubahan strategi penguasa dalam menghadapi 
mereka. Strategi kelompok radikal telah berubah dari penyerangan berskala 
besar terhadap simbol-simbol asing bergeser pada kekerasan berskala kecil 
terutama pada persoalan penerapan hukum. Pemerintah, di sisi lain, cenderung 
mengambil tindakan tegas terhadap mereka yang diduga terlibat kekerasan 
kelompok radikal. Tulisan ini juga melihat perubahan-perubahan dan 
kesinambungan strategi dari kelompok radikal serta evolusi ideologi Islam 
yang menjustifikasi aksi-aksi kekerasan. Kesimpulan lainnya adalah bahwa 
keterlibatan kalangan muda dalam kegiatan dialog mengenai Islam dan demokrasi 
menjadikan mereka terhindar sekaligus memutus rantai rekrutmen gerakan radikal dan 
terorisme.]
Keywords:  terrorism, terrorist strategy, Indonesian ideology, Densus-88, 
the National Counter Terrorism Agency (BNPT). 
A. Introduction
Here I consider change and continuity in Indonesian Islamist 
ideology and terrorist strategies in relation to my field of  research, 
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Indonesian terrorism studies. The discussion will be divided into two 
parts: ideology and strategies. The hypothesis I explore is that while 
terrorist strategies are undergoing continual change, there exists an 
underlying ideology, which continues to sustain and provide a “higher 
purpose” to violent jihadist activities. It is precisely this ideology --which 
utilises, misinterprets and manipulates a combination of  religious, political 
and social messages-- which creates a pressing sense of  injustice and 
righteousness in the minds of  young, new recruits. Effectively “short-
circuiting” the misuse of  this ideology as a tool of  recruitment is perhaps 
the most important task in the prevention of  terrorism in Indonesia – a 
sentiment echoed by People’s Consultative Assembly deputy speaker 
Hajriyanto Thohari when he said “Arrests continue to be made but 
terrorist suspects continue to emerge. Therefore serious and systematic 
measures are needed to break the chain (emphasis added).”2
An analysis of  media reports and expert commentaries3 indicates 
that terrorist strategies are continually undergoing change. This is in part 
due to internal influences, however it is also undoubtedly in large part 
due to the on-going successes of  police. The police specialist counter-
terrorism detachment, Densus 88, has had extraordinary success in 
investigating, uncovering, apprehending and neutralising jihadist groups 
and individuals. Some commentators hasten to add that the police 
have also had their fair share of  luck as terrorists have shown a level of  
carelessness and ineptitude that has certainly aided police in their task.4In 
any event, at last count, over the past 10 years, police had arrested over 
700 suspects and killed over 60 alleged terrorists in counter terrorism 
2 Markus Junianto Sihalolo and Farouk Arnaz, “Bloody Densus 88 Raids Reveal 
Disturbing Detail”, Jakarta Globe (11 May 2013), http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/
news/densus-88-searching-for-missing-terrorist-funds/.
3 Of  note are the expert reports compiled by the International Crisis Group 
in Jakarta. One recent report entitled How Indonesian Extremists Regroup Asia Report 
N°22816 Jul 2012 provides a detailed analysis of  the strategic responses of  terrorist 
groups following police raids on a terrorist training camp in Aceh in 2011. The camp 
was partially funded by radical ideologue Abu Bakar Bashir, who was later convicted 
of  financing terrorism and sentenced to 15 years imprisonment. 
4 Angela Dewan, “Indonesia’s Islamic Vigilantes ‘Turning to Terrorism’”, 
Jakarta Globe (26 Jan 2012), http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/news/indonesias-islamic-
vigilantes-turning-to-terrorism/493871#Scene_1; George Roberts, “Incompetent 
Terrorists Test Indonesia’s Luck”, ABC News (14 Sep 2012), http://www.abc.net.au/
news/2012-09-14/incompetent-terrorists-test-indonesias-luck/4262508.
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operations,5 although not without an increasing level of  criticism for 
their tactics as I will discuss further.6 
Despite these successes, terrorist groups have shown an impressive 
level of  resilience and innovation. The International Crisis Group 
commented in a July 2012 report that “the country’s violent extremists 
are weak and divided but still active.”7
The second half  of  2013 saw a string of  shootings and arrests 
of  suspected terrorists, and attacks against police. During the month of  
August, four police officers were shot and killed allegedly by terrorist 
groups, and a small bomb exploded at a Buddhist temple in Jakarta, 
injuring three people, apparently in response to attacks against Rohingya 
Muslims in Myanmar.8 
Following the arrest of  17 terrorist suspects in one week in 
May 2013, the deputy speaker of  the People’s Consultative Assembly, 
Hajriyanto Thohari, commented that “It’s really shocking to see the 
phenomenon that terrorist suspects arrested by officers are getting 
younger. This means the process of  regeneration and recruitment of  
terrorists is going smoothly and successfully.”9
Another member of  parliament from the Indonesian Democratic 
Party of  Struggle (PDI-P), Tjahjo Kumolo, also commented on the 
emergence of  “young, dynamic and energetic terrorists”.10 These new 
recruits are younger, internet savvy and enthusiastic, and they have had 
an impact on terrorist strategies, ranging from financing to recruitment 
to communications. 
B. Continuing Ideology
How then are these “young, dynamic and energetic” recruits drawn 
into the potentially fatal world of  terrorist related crime? And how can 
5 “Buddhist Vihara in Jakarta Bombed, 3 Injured”, The Jakarta Post (5 Aug 2013), 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/08/05/buddhist-vihara-jakarta-bombed-
3-injured.html.
6 Rabby Pramudatama and Nani Afrida, “After Raids, Focus on Hasmi Group 
and Terror Links”, The Jakarta Post (29 Oct 2012), http://www.thejakartapost.com/
news/2012/10/29/after-raids-focus-hasmi-group-and-terror-links.html.
7 “How Indonesian Extremists Regroup: Asia Report No. 228”, International Crisis 
Group (16 Jul 2012), http://www.crisisgroup.org/ /media/Files/asia/south-east-asia/
indonesia/228-how-indonesian-extremists-regroup.pdf.
8 “Buddhist vihara”.
9 Sihalolo and Arnaz, “Bloody Densus 88”.
10 Ibid.
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we counteract it?
In arguing against the premise that terrorist recruits are drawn to an 
ideology, reformed radical and founder of  the Institute for International 
Peace Building, Noor Huda Ismail, claims that the decision is an 
emotional one, not based on ideology:
Most people are drawn to terrorism not because of  a set of  ideas or 
lectures; they are driven by a sense of  injustice. It is more often an 
emotional decision than an intellectual one.11
However, the ideology recruiters use is precisely one which focuses 
on the issue of  injustice, which specifically aims to evoke an emotional 
response of  anger and righteous indignation. It is a continuing ideology of  
extremism and fundamentalism that has attracted a small but dangerously 
influential number of  Indonesians for at least the last two hundred 
years. It is a stream of  militant, jihadist, revolutionary thought which 
emphasises: the urgent rectification of  rampant un-Islamic practices, 
widespread moral decline, the illegitimacy of  the national government, 
Christian and Zionist conspiracies to destroy Islam, injustices suffered by 
fellow Islamic communities such as Palestine and Myanmar’s Rohingya, 
and the failure of  Islam to take its rightful place at the centre of  all human 
experience and interaction.12
In the political sphere, the ideology presses for the urgent 
rectification of  the Indonesian Constitution to include a clause obliging 
all Muslims to be subject to Shariah law. Further, that the Indonesian 
Republic should be replaced with an Islamic state, the Negara Islam 
Indonesia and that Shariah (an undefined body of  Islamic law) should be 
implemented, complete with ḥud ūd or violent punishments such as stoning 
and amputation for offenders. 
It is an ideology precisely configured to evoke the emotional 
responses of  outrage and aggression – and it is important to note that it 
misuses and misinterprets passages of  sacred texts to develop a quasi-
religious basis for its conclusions. 
While a clear majority of  Indonesians are moderate in their views of  
Islam and its place in the world, some of  these arguments clearly strike a 
11 Thomas Roberson, “My Jakarta: Noor Huda Ismail, Founder Institute for 
International Peace Building”, Jakarta Globe (31 Mar 2012), http://www.thejakartaglobe.
com/archive/my-jakarta-noor-huda-ismail-founder-institute-for-international-peace-
building/508195/.
12 Greg Fealy and Aldo Borgu, Local Jihad: Radical Islam and Terrorism in Indonesia 
(Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2005).
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chord with a wide audience; a point supported by empirical data. Sukma, 
Ma’ruf  and Abdullah conducted a survey on the attitudes of  Indonesian 
Muslims to terrorism and concluded:
The analysis in this article is based on the results of  a national survey. 
It is interesting to note that although in general Muslims in Indonesia 
rejected terrorism as a method of  struggle, they have great sympathy for 
the struggle of  their fellow Muslims in other parts of  the world. In fact, 
they are willing to give financial contribution.13 
The study found that 56% of  respondents supported the application 
of  Shariah in Indonesia, and 27.3% believed that the Jewish people and 
Israel were behind the September 11 incident.14 This indicates a significant 
proportion of  the population supports the underlying ideology outlined 
above – whether or not they support the use of  terrorism or political 
violence as a method or response. 
Other surveys such as one conducted by the reputable Pew Research 
Center indicated that 72% of  Indonesians favoured the application 
of  Shariah in Indonesia.15 While the wording of  questionnaires and 
methodology may be challenged,16 the fact would appear to remain that 
a significant yet unspecified proportion of  Indonesia’s Muslim populace 
would prefer to see the application of  Shariah law, at least in relation to 
the nation’s Muslim communities. 
Much has been written in recent times about the increasing trend 
towards radical Islam among Indonesia’s mainstream communities. A 
combination of  factors have been pointed to: the reluctance of  the 
President to speak out against Islamism due to political apathy;17 growing 
intolerance, evidenced by attacks against religious minorities such as on 
13 Rizal Sukma, Jamhari Ma’ruf, and Kamarulnizam Abdullah, “The Attitude of  
Indonesian Muslims Towards Terrorism: An Important Factor in Counter-terrorism?”, 
Journal of  Human Security, vol. 7, no. 1 (2011), pp. 21–36.
14 Ibid., pp. 30–1.
15  A r i en tha  P r iman i t a  and  E than  Ha r f en i s t ,  “Seven t y -Two 
Percent of  Indonesian Muslims Favor Shariah Law: Pew Forum”, Jakarta 
G l o b e  ( 1  M a y  2 0 1 3 ) ,  h t t p : / / w w w. t h e j a k a r t a g l o b e . c o m / n e w s /
seventy-two-percent-of-indonesians-favor-shariah-law-pew-forum/.
16 Naila Shofia and Piero Stanig, “Seven Out of  Every Ten Muslims in Indonesia 
Want Shariah — Really?”, Jakarta Globe (10 May 2013), http://www.thejakartaglobe.
com/opinion/seven-out-of-every-ten-muslims-in-indonesia-want-shariah-really/.
17 “Public Blames Yudhoyono for Rising Religious Intolerance”, The Jakarta Post 
(11 Nov 2013), http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/11/11/public-blames-
yudhoyono-rising-religious-intolerance.html.
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the Ahmadiyah sect by a the hardline Islamic Defenders Front (FPI),18 
the enactment of  anti-pornography laws and the gaoling of  celebrities19 
and magazine editors20 convicted of  contravening those laws and Islamic 
morality. 21
Much of  Merle Ricklefs’ most recent publication on Islam in 
Java is devoted to measuring social phenomena which indicate a trend 
towards greater and stricter Islamisation of  the Javanese population 
such as the growing numbers of  women who choose to wear the jilbab 
or Islamic headdress. Abuza speaks of  a rise in religiosity and the spread 
of  Salafi Islam.22 In discussing the rise of  political Islam, Abuza discusses 
political parties such as the PKS (the Prosperous Justice Party) and draws 
attention to inconsistencies in their public and internal agendas. As a 
means of  garnering public support “PKS was successful in many ways 
by downplaying its Islamist message and focussing on an anti-corruption 
platform popular with secular-minded voters.”23 For Abuza there is a 
concealed agenda which is far more wary of  Christians and the West, 
“the private agenda focuses on Islamic purity, internal discpline and 
sharia”.24 After discussing the performances of  Islamic parties in past 
elections Abuza concludes that “political Islam appears to be growing 
in popularity and influence.”25 Similarly, Robert Hefner has referred to 
the purification of  society.26 Abuza also refers to statistics which show 
a rise in pious practices such as wearing the Islamic head covering for 
women and frequency of  praying.27 
In a similar vein, Noorhaidi Hasan commented:
In tandem with the seemingly rising consciousness of  Indonesian 
Muslims to demonstrate their religious self  in the public sphere, Islam 
18 Dewan, “Indonesia’s Islamic Vigilante”.
19 Aubrey Belford, “Indonesian Pop Star Jailed over Sex Tapes”, International 
Herad Tribune (Paris, 31 Jan 2011).
20 “Indonesia vs. Playboy: Press Freedom in Post Reform Indonesia”, The Wall 
Street Journal (New York, 3 Sep 2010).
21 Merle Calvin Ricklefs, Islamisation and Its Opponents in Java: A Political, Social, 
Cultural and Religious History, c. 1930 to Present (Singapore: NUS Press, 2012).
22 Zachary Abuza, Political Islam and Violence in Indonesia (London: Routledge, 
2007), p. 92.
23 Ibid., p. 25.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid., p. 35.
26 Robert W. Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2000).
27 Abuza, Political Islam, p. 93.
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has increasingly moved to the centre and become part of  political 
expressions, legal transactions, economic activities, as well as social and 
cultural practices.28 
A further indicator of  rising Islamism raised by both Hasan and 
Abuza is the increase in the number of  regional bylaws (Perda , Peraturan 
Daerah) which attempt to enforce tenets of  Shariah at a provincial or 
sub-provincial level. Hasan also points to increased levels of  piety, a rise 
in Islamic media, the rise of  an Islamic pop culture and a Campus-Islam 
phenomenon which all indicate rising levels of  Islamic adherence and 
belief.29 The Campus-Islam phenomenon emphasises purity from vice 
and “the need to establish an exclusive moral order characterized by a 
strong commitment to Islamic beliefs, rituals, religious devotion and 
experiential religiosity”.30 
The difficulty of  measuring these trends however is clear. In an 
analysis of  the commoditization of  religious messages, and the messages 
of  Sufi televangelists, Fealy and Howell, in two separate chapters 
focussing on trends in Islam concluded that “the pluralist trend appears 
ascendant in the Indonesian Islamic marketplace,” and, “there is a revival 
of  interest in Sufism taking place across the country”.31 
Noor Huda Ismail’s point that, in the final analysis, strictly religious, 
ideological or doctrinal justifications may be of  less relevance to youth 
in making the decision to become involved in terrorism may be correct. 
Angst, alienation and an urge to rebel are arguably universal amongst 
the world’s teenagers. However, two points can be made in response: 
firstly, the manifold ideology of  hate and violence outlined above is an 
ideology whether it has a partial religious basis or not, and secondly, 
the extent to which ideology or religious texts and justifications play a 
role in any individual’s choices will vary depending on each individual. 
Indeed a statistical analysis of  the motivations of  young Indonesians who 
undertake terrorist violence would form the basis of  useful quantitative 
research, although it appears that no comprehensive data has been 
collected in that area. In any event, the appeal for and uptake of  this 
28 Noorhaidi Hasan, “The Making of  Public Islam: Piety, Agency, and 
Commodification on the Landscape of  the Indonesian Public Sphere”, Contemporary 
Islam, vol. 3, no. 3 (2009), p. 230.
29 Ibid., pp. 229–50.
30 Ibid., p. 233.
31 Greg Fealy and Sally White (eds.), Expressing Islam: Religious Life and Politics in 
Indonesia (Singapore: Institute of  Southeast Asian Studies, 2008).
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ideology of  hate by Indonesia’s Muslim youth, is an area which requires 
careful attention and further research if  governments and lawmakers are 
serious about “breaking the chain”. 
C. Historical Roots of  Violent Ideology
While recognising that the vast majority of  Indonesians reject 
violence and are relatively moderate in their views about the place 
of  Islam in their lives and their communities, it must be recognised 
that an unspecified minority does advocate a violent approach to the 
strict implementation of  Islam in Indonesia. Where, then, did this 
uncompromising, intolerant and violent ideology stem from? Indonesian 
people are, after all, known to be some of  the most friendly, welcoming 
people in the world. To answer that question we must look at history. 
Those who have studied even the most basic history of  the Indonesian 
archipelago will know that the two great world religions to arrive in 
Indonesia prior to European contact were Hindu-Buddhism and Islam. 
Both came as the result of  maritime technology and trade via India.32
While most people in the West automatically identify Islam with 
Arabs, the reality is that Arabs only make up around 15% of  the world’s 
Muslims.33 Indonesia, Pakistan, India and Bangladesh, situated in South 
and South-east Asia, are the world’s four most populous Muslim societies 
and together make up over 50% of  the world’s Muslims.34 
In discussing the arrival of  Islam in Indonesia the role of  the Sufi 
mystics is a key element. As this passage from historian Dong Sull Choi 
points out:
Unlike Islam in the Middle East and India, Indonesia was not conquered 
by force. The Sufis came not only as teachers but as traders and 
politicians...Sufism is the science of  the direct knowledge of  God; its 
doctrines and methods derive from the Koran and Islamic revelation. 
Sufism freely makes use of  paradigms and concepts derived from Greek 
and even Hindu sources. The Sufis communicated their religious ideas in 
a form compatible with beliefs already held in Indonesia. For instance, 
pantheistic doctrines were easily understood because of  Hindu teachings 
extant in the archipelago. The resemblance between the Sufi outlook and 
32 For a complete history of  the arrival of  Islam in Indonesia, see Merle Calvin 
Ricklefs, A History of  Modern Indonesia, ca. 1300 to the Present (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1981).
33 Dong Sull Choi, “The Process of  Islamization and its Impact on Indonesia”, 
Comparative Civilizations Review, no. 34 (1996), pp. 11–26.
34 Ibid.
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Hinduism was great. The Sufis stressed religious retreats and minimized 
the importance of  mosque worship...and, of  course, centered their belief  
on the individual mystical experience of  God.35 
In its earliest guises, therefore, Islam in Indonesia was not presented 
as a strict alternative to the existing Hindu-Buddhist beliefs and pantheon 
of  gods. It was hugely adaptable, and local practices and customs such as 
the wayang were used by early Muslim missionaries to win over the local 
populace. Indonesian Islam is, as Choi puts it, “rather different from the 
austere form found in the Middle East.”36 
So when and how did this continuing tension arise between the 
accommodating, syncretic, mystical form of  Sufi Islam and the more 
austere Wahhabist form? Scholars appear to agree that it dates back 
to around the 1780s with the arrival back in West Sumatra of  Muslim 
pilgrims who had completed the obligatory Haj pilgrimage to the sacred 
sites of  Islam. 
Writing about this period of  Indonesian history, Greg Fealy 
commented that:
From the 1780s, people returning from the pilgrimage and study in the 
Middle East set about “reforming” local Islamic practices and applying 
Islamic law more strictly in the region. They opposed gambling, the use 
of  intoxicants, and “un-Islamic” entertainment such as cockfighting. 
Their uncompromising puritanism sparked fierce resistance from the 
local religious and political elite and from the Dutch, and eventually 
led to the outbreak of  the Padri Wars during the early decades of  the 
nineteenth century.37 
The tension between the Padri and the Sufi Tarekat orders, as 
well as the Dutch colonial authorities who were drawn into the conflict, 
developed into an all-out war which raged from 1821 to 1838. As George 
Fowler explains:
Although the Padri were ultimately crushed by the Dutch forces and 
their main leaders either killed or exiled, a more orthodox form of  Islam 
had succeeded in establishing itself  by expanding religious schools and 
strengthening the position of  religious teachers in the nagari.38 
From the mid-1800s, therefore, a strict Wahhabist interpretation of  
35 Ibid., p. 17.
36 Ibid., p. 14.
37 Fealy and Borgu, Local Jihad, p. 17.
38 Marah Rusli, Sitti Nurbaya: A Love Unrealized, English edition (Jakarta: Lontar 
Foundation, 2009), p. xv.
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Islam had begun to take hold in some parts of  the Indonesian archipelago. 
Contemporaneous and subsequent events would reinforce this violent 
mentality in the minds of  some of  its adherents. These included the Java 
war of  1825 to 1830 during which Javanese Prince Diponegoro used 
Islam as a banner around which to rally and unify his troops against the 
infidel, foreign oppressors, the Dutch. 
During the 20th century there were a string of  political and military 
defeats which contributed to a sense of  outrage, resentment and grievance 
among some Islamic groups. Among them was the failure of  Islam to be 
specially recognised in the Constitution. The so-called “Jakarta Charter” 
issue centred around “nine little words” omitted from the Constitution 
at the last minute which would have obliged all Indonesian Muslims to 
follow the precepts of  Islamic law.39 Then there was the Darul Islam 
(DI) uprising of  the 1940s, 50s and 60s – led by the charismatic Javanese 
spiritualist leader Kartosoewirjo. While Kartosoewirjo was captured and 
executed in 1962, an event which effectively put an end to the uprising, it 
is important to note that out of  the ashes of  DI grew Jemaah Islamiyah 
(JI) and all of  its subsequent offshoot organisations. JI, which still exists 
and operates in Indonesia, is a violent organisation formerly led by Abu 
Bakar Bashir and responsible for the heinous Bali bombings of  2002. 
During the Soeharto New Order era, there were further government 
actions which provoked a sense of  righteous indignation and grievance 
from hard-line Islamist groups. The Asas Tunggal legislation of  1983 
required all social organisations to proclaim Pancasila as their ideological 
basis. There were also instances of  state brutality against Islamic groups 
such as the 1984 Tanjung Priok shootings and Lampung in 1989.40 
There were other key international events in the 1970s and 
80s which led to the rise of  extremist ideology and terrorist groups 
willing to use violence to achieve their goals. The Iranian revolution 
was a galvanizing moment which showed that an Islamic revolutionary 
movement could throw off  a western backed regime and establish an 
Islamic state. Also, Indonesian Mujahidin went to Afghanistan to train 
and fight and brought back bomb-making and military skills. At the 
same time, increasing numbers of  Indonesians received their education 
in Middle Eastern countries such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Palestine. 
All of  these factors led to a growing ideology among fundamentalist 
39 Timothy Lindsey, Indonesia: Law and Society, 2nd edition (New South Wales: 
The Federation Press, 2008).
40 Ibid.
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groups based on overthrowing the “illegitimate” state government and 
establishing an Islamic state through violent revolution.41
D. Changing Strategies
Returning to the theme of  change and continuity; having discussed the 
continuing underlying ideology of  terrorist groups we turn now to discuss 
their changing and evolving strategies. How have terrorist strategies in 
Indonesia evolved in recent years and what useful lessons and predictions 
can we draw from those observations?
It is worth noting that the last major terrorist bombing was the 
Marriott/Ritz Carlton attack of  2009 in which there were seven fatalities 
and 50 injured. Also a key event in the same year, a plot to assassinate 
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) and launch a massive 
Mumbai-style attack against state officials, hotels and tourists, planned for 
Indonesian Independence day the 17th August, was uncovered and foiled 
by police.42 This planned attack, although unrealised, marked a turning 
point of  sorts. No longer were terrorists merely targeting foreigners in 
foreign hotels. This event, with its undeniably personal element aimed 
directly at the Indonesian President and the most senior members of  the 
state apparatus saw terrorism treated as a serious state security issue for 
the first time, rather than just an extraordinary crime. It led to the fast-
tracked formation of  the National Counter Terrorism Agency (BNPT) 
and to a major tactical shift in counter-terrorism tactics. Given subsequent 
events it is reasonable to ask whether, following the uncovering of  this 
plot, Densus 88 were given orders to shoot to kill.
Whereas all of  those responsible for the Bali bombings of  2002 
were apprehended alive, and went on to stand trial, since around 
2009/2010 the instances of  fatal police shootings of  terrorist suspects 
have increased dramatically. On the other side of  the coin, since around 
41 Fealy and Borgu, Local Jihad. It should be noted that while this paper focuses 
on Islamist or Jihadist terrorism in Indonesia – this is not the only form or motivation 
for terrorism in the country. There are other groups which are willing to use shocking 
violence against civilians to bring attention to their causes. One notable example is 
ethno-separatist groups in Papua, who have engaged violent strategies against police 
and civilians, and who could arguably be labeled as terrorist; Sidney Jones, “Papuan 
‘Sparatists’ vs Jihadi ‘Terrorists’: Indonesian Policy Dilemmas”, International Crisis Group 
(22 Jan 2013), http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/speeches/2013/jones-
papuan-separatists.aspx, accessed 19 Sep 2013.
42 “Indonesia ‘Uncovers Plot to Kill President’”, BBC News (2010), http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8682822.stm, accessed 9 Dec 2013.
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2010, almost all fatalities from “terrorist” attacks have been police. “Since 
2009, all but one of  those killed by jihadists or in terrorist attacks in 
Indonesia have been police: ten in 2010, three in 2011 and eight in 2012.”43 
It could be said that, in effect, a war is raging between two discrete 
factions: Jihadist groups on the one hand and the Indonesian Police (Polri) 
on the other. It may be argued that this change indicates an ideological 
shift on the part of  terrorist groups from targeting the “far enemy” to 
the “near enemy”, although it appears just as likely that this war is fuelled 
to a large extent by simple revenge. 
That may be true, but there are also practical reasons for terrorists 
to target police – and there is undoubtedly much debate and discussion 
within terrorist groups about which targets are most appropriate and 
strategically beneficial. Large bombings of  public places indiscriminately 
kill too many Muslims and can lead to a backlash from the very people the 
terrorist groups are trying to recruit to their cause. Killing police on the 
other hand has many practical benefits, it is a source of  weapons, and it 
gives fellow mujahidin something to do, especially after they have received 
their basic training. A simple low level attack on a police post may also 
be a kind of  initiation rite for a newly trained fighter. It must be asked 
though, whether the real aim of  the attacks is to create fear? If  not we 
may need to rethink labelling and prosecuting these attacks as terrorism. 
As Jones points out:
It used to be that jihadis saw the creation of  fear as a very specific 
objective. One man involved in the 2004 Australian embassy bombing, 
when asked what his aim was, said, “We wanted to make Western nations 
tremble.” The aim now isn’t that cosmic; it’s much more instrumental. It’s 
about getting weapons, taking revenge, and giving militants something 
to do, particularly after they’ve undergone training. While the attacks are 
sometimes couched –usually after the fact-- in terms of  moving against 
thaghut (anti-Islamic oppressors supported by the West), that kind of  
rationalisation is less frequent these days. The main aim of  killing police 
is certainly not to create fear.44 
Therefore, the first major change in terrorist strategies that we 
can point to over the past few years, is that terrorist groups have gone 
from large-scale bombing operations of  symbolic foreign targets (Bali 
nightclubs, Embassies, foreign-owned hotels) to low-cost, low-level 
attacks against Indonesian police officers. On the other side, police 
43 Jones, “Papuan Separatists”.
44 Ibid., p. 2.
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have also shown a marked increase in the numbers of  fatal shootings of  
terrorist suspects. 
Another event which had a major impact on the daily operations 
and changing strategies of  terrorist groups in Indonesia was the police 
raid of  a terrorist training camp in Aceh in 2010. This event created 
repercussions and effects on the methods and inter-relations of  terrorist 
groups which are still being felt today. The raid itself  led to over 200 
arrests and yielded large amounts of  intelligence. However, it also showed 
that the commitment to large-scale organised jihad was, at that time, still 
high. Following its discovery and disbanding by police, it inspired a new 
wave of  activity fuelled by revenge as groups were forced to disperse 
and form new alliances in other parts of  the archipelago such as Poso, 
Bima, Solo and parts of  East Kalimantan.45 
Police raids such as this force these groups to reassess their 
regrouping strategies as they merge, assist each other and blur the lines 
between their groups. There are many different terrorist groups currently 
operating in Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah, Jemaah Anshorut Tauhid, Ring 
Banten, DI Akram, Mujahidin KOMPAK, Mujahidin Indonesian Timor 
to name just a few, but they all share a similar underlying ideology and they 
will group together and assist one another when they are “on the run”.46 
What conclusions can then be drawn from an examination of  the 
evolving strategies of  Indonesian terrorist groups? They appear to be 
increasingly unsophisticated, fly-by-night and underfunded. We have 
noted the trend away from large sophisticated bombings, which require 
significant levels of  planning and funding, towards relatively cheap and 
simple police shootings. There have also been other low-tech plots such 
as a failed plot to poison police with ricin, and instances of  stabbings 
and small bombs.47 
Terrorist financing is another important area where the strategies of  
45 “Indonesian Jihadism: Small Groups, Big Plans”, International Crisis Group 
(2011), http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/204-
indonesian-jihadism-small-groups-big-plans.aspx.
46 Ibid.
47 Zubaidah Nazeer, “Fears Over New Sulawesi Terror Group”, Jakarta Globe 
(13 Feb 2013), http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/archive/fears-over-new-sulawesi-
terror-group/571473/#Scene_1; “Police Arrest Suspect in Murder of  Brimob Officer”, 
The Jakarta Post (6 Nov 2013), http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/11/06/
police-arrest-suspect-murder-brimob-officer.html; Rahmat, “Man Hurls Bomb at South 
Sulawesi Governor”, Jakarta Globe (12 Nov 2012), http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/
archive/man-hurls-bomb-at-south-sulawesi-governor/555657/#Scene_1.
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both the terrorist groups and law enforcement agencies are undergoing 
change. It is worth noting that the first Bali bombing was directly funded 
by an external international source; Al-Qaeda. However, since then, 
international counter-terrorism financing laws have become much more 
sophisticated and international sources of  funds have long since dried 
up. Now, local terrorist groups are forced to find methods to finance 
themselves, and this usually means by fai or by committing crimes where 
the proceeds are used to fund terrorism. There have been several cases 
of  robberies of  banks and jewellery stores – one terrorist group was 
even forced to steal motorcycles and resell them on the black market.48 
A more lucrative source of  funds has been internet fraud; the Head of  
Indonesia’s counter-terrorism agency revealed in 2012 that terrorists had 
been successful in hacking multi-level marketing sites and stealing around 
Rp7-8 billion (approximately AU$700,000).49 Given that the Bali bombing 
was funded with only around $40,000, the potential for the destructive 
use of  such funds is enormous. 
One method of  financing which Indonesian terrorist groups have 
thankfully not yet resorted to, is kidnapping for ransom. This practice 
has been successfully implemented by terrorists in other parts of  the 
world, particularly sub-Saharan Africa. For example, “Al-Qaeda in the 
Islamic Maghreb, active in West Africa, has made hundreds of  thousands 
of  euros kidnapping foreigners and demanding huge ransoms for their 
safe return.”50 
In response to pressures from the international community, 
particularly the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), in March 2013 
Indonesia brought its counter-terrorism financing legislation into line 
with its commitments under international law, with the enactment of  
Law No.9 2013 on the Prevention and Eradication of  the Financing 
of  Terrorism (Undang-undang Pencegahan dan Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana 
Pendanaan Terorisme 2013). While the laws provide a legislative regime for 
the monitoring of  suspicious transactions, and oblige financial services 
providers to apply “Know Your Customer” procedures, with significant 
penalties for non-compliance, the laws are not yet being applied to their 
48 “Indonesian Jihadism”.
49 Sandro Gatra, “Memutus Rantai Terorisme dengan Senjata Undang-Undang”, 
Indonesia Media (13 Sep 2012), http://www.indonesiamedia.com/2012/09/13/
memutus-rantai-terorisme-dengan-senjata-undang-undang/.
50 Richard Barrett, “Preventing the Financing of  Terrorism”, Case Western Reserve 
Journal of  International Law, vol. 44, no. 3 (2012), p. 725.
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full potential. Consequently, the FATF continues to include Indonesia 
on its list of  “high risk or non-cooperative jurisdictions.”51 It remains for 
overseeing financial bodies such as the PPATK (Indonesian Financial 
Transactions and Reports Centre), in cooperation with police, to ensure 
the effective application of  the laws so that financing of  terrorist groups 
is effectively cut off.52
Finally, how have recruitment strategies evolved and changed 
over recent years? A number of  points may be made here. As increasing 
numbers of  terrorists are convicted and sent to prison, prisons and 
prison visits have played an increasingly important role in recruiting 
and reinforcing bonds between radical individuals. Other methods for 
recruiting vulnerable candidates to the cause of  violent jihad include: 
pengajian, or Islamic study groups, at mosques or university campuses 
which have been targeted as recruiting grounds; internet chat forums and 
social media sites such as Facebook;53 and the targeting of  unemployed 
men living near mosques.54 Younger siblings of  slain or imprisoned 
extremists have proven to be good targets for radical recruiting and show 
the importance of  family ties in building and maintaining networks of  
terrorist connections. Arranged marriages have also been instrumental 
in reinforcing bonds. And finally taklim or fiery sermons filled with hate 
speech and incitement to violence, by radical clerics can serve as informal 
meeting points for those with similar radical views.55 Comprehensive 
government strategies for monitoring and countering these forms of  
51 Financial Action Task Force Annual Report 2011-2012 (2012), http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/brochuresannualreports/FATF annual report 2011 
2012 website.pdf; “The Financial Action Task Force Public Statement”, The Financial 
Action Task Force (21 Jun 2013), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/countries/d-i/indonesia/
documents/public-statement-june-2013.html.
52 For a full discussion of  the Indonesian counter-terrorism financing legislation, 
see: Adam Fenton, “Forbidden Funds – Indonesia’s New Counter-terrorism Financing 
Legislation”, presented at the The 4th CILS International Law Conference on 
Transnational Organized Crime (Jakarta: Center for International Law Studies, Faculty 
of  Law, Universitas Indonesia and Faculty of  Law, Universitas Syiah Kuala, Banda 
Aceh, 28 Oct 2013), in press.
53  Farouk Arnaz ,  Indone s i an  Te r r o r i s t s  Ge t t i n g  Mor e  Web -Sa vvy 
( 3 1  M ay  2 0 1 3 ) ,  h t t p : / / w w w. t h e j a k a r t a g l o b e . c o m / n e w s / j a k a r t a /
indonesian-terrorists-getting-more-web-savvy/.
54 J.  Templin,  “Keeping Radical  Is lamists  from Recr uit ing on 
Indonesia’s Campuses”, Time (2013), http://www.time.com/time/video/pla
yer/0,32068,1118418176001_2089992,00.html.
55 “Indonesian Jihadism”.
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recruitment are needed to effectively neutralise and short-circuit the 
cycle of  recruitment and violence. New laws to silence the hate speech 
of  radical clerics have also been proposed, although they raise inevitable 
concerns about the right to freedom of  speech. One commentator has 
pointed to a legal loophole which allows terrorists to spread hate speech 
online without fear of  prosecution.56 
A further concern is recidivism. There have been many instances 
of  prisoners, who, upon their release from prison, either re-established 
contact with old networks or were introduced to terrorist networks while 
in prison. There have also been several examples of  ordinary prisoners 
being recruited and radicalised in prison that then go on to commit 
Islamist violence upon their release.57 
In Indonesia, experts say, some radicals finish their sentences with an 
even greater commitment to deadly jihad. Of  120 arrested and 25 killed 
in raids since February 2010, some 26 had previously been in prison 
for terrorist acts, according to the International Crisis Group, which 
researches deadly conflict.58 
The effective monitoring of  prison populations, the separation 
of  radicalising prisoners from the general prison population, and the 
post-release monitoring of  prisoners are all areas in which authorities 
could make gainful improvements in their standard operating procedures. 
While some attempts at prison-based deradicalisation programs have been 
made, there appears to be no standardised nation-wide program. Rather, 
ad hoc attempts depend on the individual efforts of  prison authorities at 
each institution.59 
With hundreds of  convicted terrorists due for release from prison 
over the next few years, preventing terrorists from reoffending is perhaps 
one of  the greatest challenges. Non-state programs may offer useful 
56 Arnaz, Indonesian Terrorists.
57 Ninik Karmini, “Teaching Jihad in Indonesian Prisons”, Jakarta Globe (30 
Jun 2011), http://paywall.thejakartaglobe.com/archive/teaching-jihad-in-indonesian-
prisons/?doing_wp_cron=1386649956.1412270069122314453125>; Margot O’Neill, 
“Indonesian Jails Used as Terrorist Incubators”, ABC News (18 May 2011), http://www.
abc.net.au/news/2011-05-18/indonesian-jails-used-as-terrorist-incubators/2718998; 
Carl Ungerer, Jihadists in Jail: Radicalisation and the Indonesian Prison Experience, Annual 
Report (Canberra: ASPI-RSIS, 2011), https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/special-
report-issue-40-jihadists-in-jail-radicalisation-and-the-indonesian-prison-experience/
SR40_jihadists_in_jail.pdf.
58 Karmini, “Teaching Jihad”.
59 Ungerer, Jihadists in Jail.
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models for disengagement and deradicalisation, such as that run by Noor 
Huda Ismail – founder of  the Institute for International Peace Building.60 
As reformed radical Ismail explains, reintegrating former terrorists can be 
achieved by providing employment opportunities and a cognitive opening:
We encourage critical thinking. Some of  the former criminals work in 
a restaurant with an Australian chef. In a cafe, you cannot choose your 
customers; every visitor must be served equally nicely. It helps to show 
them that all people are equal. It gives them what I call a cognitive opening, 
which provides them different perspectives on things. These interactions 
allow them to establish a level of  trust.61 
Strategies of  both terrorist groups and law enforcement agencies 
are in a state of  constant change – a fact which presents challenges for 
terrorism studies in any country. Strategies for the choice of  targets, 
financing, recruiting, and networking have all shown significant changes 
over recent years. Obviously the effect of  the internet on terrorist 
communications, financing and operations has been significant. 
Enforcement strategies must therefore be developed which take account 
of  and tackle these changing modes of  operation.
E. Concluding Remark
What predictions can be made about future events? What have 
terrorist groups learned and how will that affect their behaviour in 
future? With major police raids such as the one on the Aceh training 
camp, terrorist groups now realise the extent to which they have been 
infiltrated and surveilled by police and that they need to be much more 
careful in vetting new members before they trust them. They will become 
much more secretive and careful about who they reveal their plans to.62 
At the same time, police will probably come under more pressure 
to respect human rights, legal processes, the presumption of  innocence 
and non-lethal alternatives to fatally shooting suspects. These factors, 
combined with the impending release of  hundreds of  convicted terrorists 
in the coming years, present a huge challenge for law enforcement 
authorities who have struggled to maintain community support, and to 
safeguard their own safety, let alone the safety of  the wider community. 
When Indonesia’s new Chief  of  Police Sutarman took over from Timor 
60 Roberson, “My Jakarta”.
61 Ibid., p. 1.
62 “Indonesian Jihadism”.
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Pradopo there were calls for him to ensure the safety of  the community 
by arresting those responsible for attacks on police.63 
In conclusion, what lessons can the Indonesian government and 
law enforcers learn from the preceding discussion? The following points 
may be offered:
 ● Greater attention is needed in identifying and countering issues of  
recruitment/ideology through a dialogue which engages Muslim 
scholars and Muslim youth. 
 ● The ideas and recommendations of  young Indonesian scholars of  
social sciences and law who are conducting research in this area should 
be sought out and implemented. 
 ● Law Reform; the use of  hate speech as an ideological tool of  
recruitment must be tackled in a way which is consistent with 
community expectations on principles of  free speech.
 ● Effective application of  counter-terrorism financing laws by the 
PPATK and police is needed to cut-off  terrorist financing and bring 
Indonesia into line with its international obligations as set out by the 
FATF.
 ● Implementation of  a comprehensive nation-wide prison 
deradicalisation/disengagement program.
 ● Greater monitoring of  terrorist prisoners during their prison sentence 
and post-release to ensure that they do not re-establish contacts with 
terrorist networks upon release.
 ● Post release programs to reintegrate prisoners back into society should 
be encouraged, e.g. program run by Noor Huda Ismail employing 
released terrorists in a local restaurant. 
 ● Review and reform police procedures where necessary, including:
• Non-lethal alternatives to shooting
• Use of  torture
• Lack of  oversight or review 
 ● Tighter airport security; terrorists have been able to travel freely using 
false documents.
A culture of  police violence against suspects leads to further 
violence in retaliation. Shakespeare expressed this concept most succinctly 
63 Sandro Gatra, “Pesan untuk Sutarman: Jangan Lupakan Penembakan 
Polisi!”, Kompas.com (Jakarta, 9 Oct 2013), http://nasional.kompas.com/
read/2013/10/09/0952184/Pesan.untuk.Sutarman.Jangan.Lupakan.Penembakan.
Polisi.
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and powerfully in the phrase “blood begets blood” in Macbeth (Act III 
Scene IV). While a certain level of  violence is sometimes necessary in 
police operations to apprehend violent and armed suspects, police ought 
to be cautious in using unnecessary and excessive force. 
Most importantly perhaps, returning to the original question of  how 
to “short circuit” continuing recruitment through the abuse of  a continuing 
ideology, it is important to grapple with that ideology. Young Indonesians 
need to be educated on the principles of  democracy and the notion that in 
a democracy individuals and groups have the right to agitate for political 
and social change. To hold the view that Indonesia ought to become an 
Islamic state and strictly apply the tenets of  Shariah law is a valid political 
goal. In a true democracy there should be no stigma attached to those 
who hold this view, just as the establishment of  a communist utopia is 
a valid political stance or ideal. It is the methods which individuals and 
groups use to express and bring about those political and social changes 
which are in question. The non-violent expression of  political views is 
essential in a true and fully-functioning democracy. However, the use of  
shocking violence against civilians can never be condoned or accepted 
under any circumstances. Indonesia’s politically active youth, and for that 
matter some senior political actors, must be made to see that non-violent 
political dissent is the only acceptable means of  political expression. In 
illustrating the point, it may be helpful to emphasise to Indonesia’s future 
political leaders that the massive political changes made possible during 
the Arab Spring were through peaceful protest rather than terrorist action, 
which is ultimately self  destructive. 
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